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Zimbabwe’s Crisis: Time for an African
Solution
George B.N. Ayittey,
Ph.D.
The crisis in Zimbabwe demands an urgent resolution. The economy
has virtually collapsed. Inflation is running at 7,700 percent.
There are rampant shortages of nearly all essential necessities.
Unemployment rages at 80 percent and HIV/AIDS ravages the
population. More distressing, the ruling ZANU-PF party of
President Robert Mugabe is stone-deaf, hopelessly blind, and
clueless. Impervious to reason, appeals and even international
condemnation, it does not see the failures of its own policies,
preferring to blame the West and colonialism for Zimbabwe’s
woes. Meanwhile, his daughter, Bona, is studying at the London
School of Economics, according to the Guardian Unlimited (March
26, 2007).
Even more disconcerting is the impotence of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the regional organization, the
African Union (AU) and the international community to effect
real change and bring relief to the suffering people of
Zimbabwe. Namibia gives the dodge by claiming it is an “internal
matter.” “Quiet diplomacy” by President Thabo Mbeki of South
Africa has been a miserable fiasco. And “smart sanctions” by the
U.S. and the European Union, imposed after fraudulent elections
in 2001, have failed to dislodge the Mugabe regime or bring
change. Now, the international and African community is divided
over what to do next.
Past efforts to resolve the Zimbabwe crisis failed because they
appealed to the good sense of the Mugabe regime to initiate
change. But the depth of the crisis in Zimbabwe is such that the
government of Robert Mugabe alone cannot solve it; nor can the
MDC or any single individual or political party. Hence, it must
take the collective action of all Zimbabweans. As such a
mechanism must be established that permits this. Fortunately for
Zimbabwe, it does not have to re-invent the wheel. Such a
mechanism, known as the “Sovereign National Conference” (SNC)
already exists in Africa itself and derived from Africa’s own
indigenous institution of village meeting.
When a crisis erupts in an African village, the chief and the
elders would summon a village meeting and put the issue before
the people. The village assembly or meeting is a common feature
of traditional African political systems. It is called asetena
kese by the Ashanti of Ghana, ama ala by the Igbo of Nigeria,
guurti by the Somali, pitso by the Xhosa of South African, ndaba
by the Zulu and kgotla by the Tswana of Botswana. At the village
assembly the issue is debated by the people until a consensus is
reached. During the debate, the chief makes no effort to
manipulate the outcome or sway public opinion. Nor are there
bazooka-wielding rogues, intimidating or instructing people on
what to say. People express their ideas openly and freely
without fear of arrest. Those who cared participate in the
decision-making process. No one is locked out. Once a decision
is reached, it is binding on all, including the chief.
In the early 1990s, this indigenous African institution was
revived by pro-democracy forces in the form of "sovereign
national conferences" to chart a new political future in Benin,
Cape Verde Islands, Congo, Malawi, Mali, South Africa, and
Zambia. Benin's nine-day "national conference" began on Feb 19,
1990, with 488 delegates, representing various political,
religious, trade union, and other groups encompassing the broad
spectrum of Beninois society. The conference, whose chairman was
Father Isidore de Souza, held "sovereign power" and its
decisions were binding on all, including the government. It
stripped President Matthieu Kerekou of power, scheduled
multiparty elections that ended 17 years of autocratic Marxist
rule.
Congo's national conference had more delegates (1,500) and
lasted longer than three months. But
when it was over in June 1991, the 12-year old government of
General Denis Sassou-Nguesso had been dismantled. The
constitution was rewritten and the nation's first free elections
were scheduled for June 1992. Before the conference, Congo was
among Africa's most avowedly Marxist-Leninist states. A Western
business executive said, "The remarkable thing is that the
revolution occurred without a single shot being fired . . .
(and) if it can happen here, it can happen anywhere" (The New
York Times, 25 June 1991, A8).
In South Africa, the vehicle used to make that difficult but
peaceful transition to a multiracial democratic society was the
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). It began
deliberations in July 1991, with 228 delegates drawn from about
25 political parties and various anti-apartheid groups. The de
Klerk government made no effort to "control" the composition of
CODESA. Political parties were not excluded; not even ultra
right-wing political groups, although they chose to boycott its
deliberations. CODESA strove to reach a "working consensus" on
an interim constitution and set a date for the March 1994
elections. It established the composition of an interim or
transitional government that would rule until the elections were
held. More important, CODESA was "sovereign." Its decisions were
binding on the de Klerk government. President Frederick de Klerk
could not abrogate any decision made by CODESA -- just as the
African chief could not disregard any decision arrived at the
village meeting.
At a joint Councilors Meeting between Inkatha Freedom Party and
the Democratic Alliance, Tony Leon, leader of the AD, said on
March 15, 2002:
"Perhaps the most significant interaction, until now, took
place during the eight months of the "Natal KwaZulu Indaba,"
back in 1986. The Indaba foreshadowed
the negotiations of the 1990's in important ways. It brought to
the same table South Africans from every group and background;
it was premised on a need to overcome the racial divides and
inequalities of Apartheid without resorting to violence; it
considered and adopted a set of proposals that were inspired by
many of the same values and principles now enshrined in our
democratic constitution . . .And so the Indaba inaugurated the
principles and articles of the Indaba Constitution, which
prefigured many of the details in the Republic of South African
Constitution” (IFP website: www.ifp.org.za).
Clearly, the vehicle exists -- in Africa itself -- for peaceful
transition to democratic rule or resolution of political crisis.
This vehicle worked in Benin, South Africa and Zambia and will
work in Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe and
the other African countries where de facto political apartheid
reigns. This is the vehicle all stake-holders in Zimbabwe must
insist on for Zimbabweans to solve their own internal problem.
It is the same vehicle all outside Zimbabwe – from SADC, the AU
to the UN and the U.S. Congress – must insist on for peaceful
change in Zimbabwe.
President Kufuor of Ghana, in his capacity as the new AU
Chairman, should enjoin all member states to insist on the
convocation of a SNC, not just ask Mugabe and opposition
activists to “talk to one another.” African sanctions should be
imposed if the Mugabe regime fails to comply. Such sanctions may
include the blockade of land-locked Zimbabwe by SADC member
countries and a cut-off of electricity by South Africa.
AU Commission Chairman, Prof. Alpha Oumar Konare, the former
president of Mali, is fed up with the old policy of
“non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.” He
wants this policy replaced with “non-indifference.” At the
January meeting of the AU Executive Council in Addis Ababa, he
warned that: “We have to assume our principle of
non-indifference [defined as] courteous and united interference
[in member countries]. If we cannot tell the truth, we are
heading for disaster” (New African, March 2007; p.11).
Indeed, the alternate scenario is horrific. If nothing is done
in Zimbabwe, there will be a complete meltdown and implosion --
as was the case in Liberia (1991), Somalia (1993), Rwanda
(1994), Burundi (1993), Zaire (1996), Sierra Leone (1999), Ivory
Coast (2000) and Togo (2005). And the cost of rebuilding and
putting Zimbabwe back together will be enormous. Thus it is a
question of act now or pay a much higher price later.
________________
The writer, a native of Ghana, is a Distinguished Economist
at American University and President of the Free Africa
Foundation, both in Washington, DC. His latest book is Africa
Unchained by Palgrave/MacMillan.
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