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Emerging African development thinking
Continued from
Part Two
To Read
Part
One
African chiefs have been the enduring fixtures on
the traditional system. They command far more
authority and respect from their people than central
governments. In addition, they are the custodians of
the land. As such, no credible agricultural
development can take place without their
participation. Et after independence, they were not
consulted. In fact, African nationalist leaders saw
them as a political threat and stripped them of
their traditional power and authority.
In the case of Ghana, the Governments of Ghana took
away the authority of traditional rulers by passing
laws (or acts) and decrees. In 1951, the Legislative
Assembly passed the Local Government Ordinance which
substituted Local Councils for the Native
Authorities or the Council of traditional rulers.
The Ordinance intended that elected persons rather
than traditional rulers should act as the guardians
of the welfare of the community. In 1954, another
Ordinance of the Government deprived the traditional
rulers of their representation in the Local
Councils. In 1958 (a year after Ghana became
independent), the Local Courts Act abolished the
courts of traditional rulers and took away the
authority that the Colonial Government had given
them to settle disputes among the people, as they
had done in the days before colonial rule itself.
Also in 1958, the Legislative Assembly passed the
“House of Chiefs' Act”, which confirmed that
traditional councils and the Houses of Chiefs could
resolve disputes among traditional rulers.
There were subsequent laws in 1962, 1969, 1971 and
various amendments. But, the manner in which the
Governments of Ghana have applied some of these laws
greatly weakened the position of traditional rulers
and made it clear even to those who had no idea of
the new laws that the traditional rulers can act
only if the central Government wished them to do so.
The Governments had had certain rulers removed from
their stools by notifying the public in the Gazette
that they no longer “recognized” those rulers. The
most famous examples are the removal of the rulers
of Akyem Abuakwa and Wenchi by the Government of
Kwame Nkrumah, and the rulers of Akyem Kotoku,
Wenchi and Yendi by the National Redemption Council
under the Chairmanship of the late General I.K.
Acheampong.
Nigeria was supposed to be the exception, since its
federal constitution provided for some devolution of
authority toward local authorities and traditional
rulers. Furthermore, in the struggle for
independence, there was little friction between the
traditional rulers and the elites. In fact, the
position of the National Council of Nigeria and
Cameroon in its 1954 manifesto was quite explicit:
"Our Emirs and Obas, Obongs and Etubons and
Amayonabos, are sovereigns in their own rights. This
is the verdict of our history. Accordingly, our
National Rulers must fit into the position of
Constitutional monarchs”. But it did not turn out
that way.
Beginning under Nigeria's first president, Abubakar
Balewa, the northern region government abolished the
chiefs’ status of sole native authority. In 1963,
the Emir of Kano was capriciously removed by the
federal government. After the Nigerian military coup
of 1966, the traditional rulers had hoped their
fortunes would improve but it was never to be. As
West Africa put it:
They lost their Native Authority police forces under
one military head of state; under another, they lost
more of their role and responsibilities through the
Local Government reforms of 1976; they lost their
critical authority over land use under a third; and
they lost their own forum, the House of Chiefs,
under the incoming civilian administration of the
Second Republic in 1979. Under the next military
government, they were forced for good measure, as it
were, to witness the humiliation of two of their
senior most colleagues, the Emir of Kano and the
Ooni of Ife, whose passports were withdrawn in 1984
for displeasing the military government; in military
idiom, the rulers were further humbled by being
ordered not to leave their domain without the prior
permission of their Local Government chairmen, the
new and sole channel of communication between the
traditional rulers and Government. Twenty five years
after the brusque removal of the Emir of Kano, the
traditional rulers watched the dismissal of the Emir
of Muri, once again as the outcome of a clash with
government, along with central intervention over the
appointment of the Sultan of Sokoto himself (20 26
March, 1989; p.431).
It was the same in Mozambique. When President
Joaquim Chissano's Frelimo Party won independence
from Portugal in 1975, he accused chiefs of having
been puppets of the Portuguese and stripped of their
power. During the liberation war between 1964 and
1974, chiefs in the province of Niassa gave vital
support to Frelimo and their rejection after
independence left them particularly disgruntled.
The economic systems established by African
nationalist leaders after independence were also
alien. Many of them were based on the socialist
ideology of state ownership of the means of
production, state control, state planning,
state-owned enterprises, etc. The socialist
ideology, itself, is alien.
While it is true that Africans are imbued with a
greater sense of community awareness than most
Western cultures, the concept of the individual was
not completely absent. According to a Fanti proverb:
"Life is as you (the individual) make it”. And in
the general African phrase: "I am because we are”,
in which the "we" connotes community, the "I" (the
individual or personhood) was not entirely absent.
An analogous situation is supplied by the phrase:
"Man is a social animal”. The meaning here is that
the human being desires the company of others and
abhors living alone. Accordingly, each person yearns
for some "togetherness" or "a community”. But it
cannot be inferred from this disposition that "man
is a socialist”.
Being a "social animal" (sociable or socialistic) is
totally different from being a socialist. Another
distinction should be made: Socialism as public
policy and socialism as an economic ideology. Public
policy and responsible government mandate that the
state should care about the poor, the handicapped,
the unemployed, the sick and the elderly. In that
sense, even the U.S. government is very socialist.
However, that should not be confused with socialism
as an ideology, which is rooted in political,
economic and intellectual control by the state. The
ideology of socialism, as understood and practiced,
entails government ownership of the means of
production; government control and direction of
economic activity; the operation of state
enterprises to the exclusion of privately owned
businesses; price-fixing by the state and a myriad
of state regulations and controls; one-party states
and government ownership of the press. In other
words, there is an absence of private ownership,
free markets, political and intellectual freedom.
Indigenous African economic systems are not
characterized by these absences and therefore cannot
be classified as "socialism”. Economic, political
and intellectual repression as well as state
controls, were never part of indigenous African
tradition. Nor could traditional African rulers
establish a "socialist" (state-controlled economy)
if they had wanted to since the logistics were well
beyond their reach. The control mechanisms and
measures needed to control the economy were not yet
developed.
Many of Africa's nationalist leaders either misread
their own indigenous African economic systems or
were ignorant of them. Nyerere (1962), for example,
was right in pointing to the communalism of African
peasants. It is true the people of Africa pooled
their resources together (family pot or fund,
working bees, extended family systems, etc.) and
helped one another ("communal labor"). But that
feature of traditional African society can not be
interpreted as readiness for socialism. One can be
socialistic or communalistic without necessarily
being a socialist or communist. Many rural folks in
America are socialistic in the sense that they care
about their neighbors, offer voluntary labor to help
neighbors rebuild homes devastated by tornadoes, and
watch over neighbors' property (neighborhood crime
watch). But they are hardly socialist or communists.
Neither are the Amish of Pennsylvania.
Being communalistic or socialistic did not
necessarily mean the African peasant was communist
or socialist and therefore willing to share his
wealth equally with all members of the extended
family. Julius Nyerere, ex president of Tanzania,
for example, mistook the peasant's emphasis on
kinship and community as readiness for socialism
Ujamaa (Nyerere, 1962). But even then, the sense of
community did not extend beyond one's kinship group.
It was this fundamental inability on the part of
African nationalist leaders to distinguish between
"communalism" and "socialism" that caused many of
them to adopt an ideology which they erroneously
thought could be justified by African tradition.
This resulted in some sort of comedy of errors after
independence when they attempted to copy an alien
system they did not understand to graft onto an
indigenous system they did not understand either.
One could well imagine the consequences.
Among western writers and analysts, there has also
been pervasive mythology about indigenous African
heritage. One of the most strikingly misleading
statement has been the claim of "communal ownership
of the means of production”. There was/is no such
thing as "communal ownership" of cattle or land.
Forests, rivers, lakes and the ocean were for common
usage. However, a community could set aside some
grazing land for such use. In general, however, land
was privately-owned — controlled by lineages. In
traditional Africa, the person who first settles on
unoccupied land becomes the owner. He may pass this
land on to his descendants and they can pass it to
their descendants. Thus, the land becomes
"lineage-owned" or controlled, belonging to the
first ancestor, the original settler. Kings and
chiefs may hold royal land or "stool land" in trust
but it does not belong to them or the state.
The myth of communal ownership of land may have
arisen innocently out of confusion or
misinterpretation. When an European colonialist
asked an African whom a plot of land belonged to,
the African would have replied: "It belongs to us.
We own the land”. To the African, the "we" meant his
extended family or lineage, but the European might
have assigned a much wider interpretation to the
"we" to mean the entire village community or the
tribe. Hence, "communal ownership of land”.
Furthermore, in indigenous Africa, all the means of
production were privately owned. The economic
factors of production — labor, capital, and the
entrepreneur — were owned by the peasants, not their
chiefs or the state. Huts, spears, and agricultural
implements were all private property. The profit
motive was present in most market transactions. Free
enterprise and free trade were the rule in
indigenous Africa. The natives went about their
economic activities on their own initiative and free
will. They did not line up at the entrance of the
chief's hut to apply for permits before engaging in
trade or production. What and how much they produced
were their own decisions to make. The African woman
who produced kenkey, garri or semolina herself
decided to produce those items. No one forced her to
do so. Nor did anyone order the fishermen, artisans,
craftsmen, or even hunters what to produce. In
modern parlance, those who go about their economic
activities on their own free will are called “free
enterprisers”. By this definition, the kente weavers
of Ghana, the Yoruba sculptors, the gold, silver
blacksmiths as well as the various indigenous
craftsmen, traders, and farmers were free
enterprisers. The Masai, Somali, Fulani and other
pastoralists who herded cattle over long distances
in search of water and pasture to fatten them also
were free enterprisers. So were the African traders
who traveled great distances to buy and sell
commodities — an economic risk taking venture. They
all go about their economic activities on their own
initiative, not at the behest of their traditional
rulers the chiefs. For centuries, they have been
selling their produce and wares in open, free,
village markets. African chiefs do not harass them,
impose ridiculous price controls on them, or even
fix wages and jail violators: Africans bargain over
prices. Nor do these chiefs monopolize the tribal
economy, or operate "tribal government enterprises”,
the equivalent of state enterprises.
Indigenous African markets have always been
hospitable to foreigners. Nigerian traders are
welcome, and can indeed be found, in virtually every
West African market. The local chiefs do not expel
them. Arab and Hausa long distance traders have for
centuries traded freely in African markets. So too
did the Europeans until they rolled out their guns
and abused African hospitality. Free trade and
private enterprise were the rules in indigenous
Africa.
[I wrote a book about this called Indigenous
African Institutions. It was published in 2006.]
Interview
conducted by:
Kofi
Akisah-Sarpong, Canada. September 27, 2009
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