Perhaps, the stereotype of Rawlings may have hidden the truth
E. Ablorh-Odjidja

Considering that the AU has just appointed former President Rawlings to a mission assignment in Somalia, it is time to wonder if the stereotype about Flt. Lt. Rawlings as icon of courage and the mastermind of two coups could be anywhere close to the truth.

The ex-soldier leader has also been lauded by some as a lover of freedom and democracy and the man through whose force of will sanity was brought to Ghanaian politics.

This is the stereotype. Will the appointment on Somalia reveal something else, confirm or wash out this image?

First, let us admit that Somalia is not a piece of cake. Unlike Ghana 1979 and 1981, when the armed forces and civilians alike were cowed into submission by a few armed men, Somalia is vastly different; an unruly and hostile environment suitable only for those with zeal for the afterlife; these are the militants known as the Shabab.

The Shabab, these narcotic chewing faith based insurgents of Somalia, are a wild bunch, armed with AK47s and are not likely to be impressed by a savior from Ghana whose battle experience in two coups is less than what they get in two hours of street fight in Mogadishu on any given day.

Still, Somalia is an opportunity for the Flt. Lt. Rawlings icon to welcome. Maybe his coup experiences are covert prologue to a grand overt action on the African stage. It is a historic opportunity for Rawlings to burnish his legacy, acumen and image.

For Ghana and the Mills administration (add former President Kufuor at this juncture), it is a God sent diversion. No longer will Rawlings have the time to harass them.

On the converse side, the Somalia mission affords an opportunity for others to measure Rawlings’ efficacy in helping to build a civil society. He should have little time for loud criticisms of others, a practice that was and still is his wont.

The Somalia combatants are “holy warriors.” They have no time for bribery and corruption or charges of thievery or any other rhetoric concerning pseudo-moral issues that have proven useful in Ghana. Their template for governance is based on the Sharia. Fighting for what they believe is God’s mission is all they want to hear.

Rawlings has very little chance for success within the circumstances described as war torn Somalia. He will not be carrying an AK47 himself, so his success will not be measured by valor on the battlefield, that is if that word is what describes his history best.

Rawlings’ success on the Somalia mission will vastly depend on his ability to engage these crazed combatants in a meaningful dialogue; a dialogue that plants one who believes in secular constitutional rule (perhaps) against combatants who are believers in rule preordained by God, with them as leaders.

There could be a hook for dialogue in the above situation.  Rawlings, at one time, was described as Junior Jesus, or a messiah. The obvious implication of the “chosen one” in his title may be in line with what the Somali fighters believe about their right to rule.

I am also not sure why the AU chose Rawlings, of all the stellar leaders available, as the candidate for the task of searching for constitutional peace in Somalia.

Perhaps, the formation of ECOMOG in mid 90s and its eventual victory in settling a negotiated peace in Liberia that disarmed the rebels in 1998 may have added to Rawlings reputation since this happened while he was the president of Ghana, a member state of ECOMOG. But it must be said that the backbone of the ECOMOG force; in arms, equipment, money and more was really Nigeria.

Even so, after the negotiated peace what happened to the former Liberian president Charles Taylor? After a promise of amnesty and political asylum in Nigeria, he was easily handed over to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.

This ruse in Liberia has not worked in the search for peace with even the Somali pirates, who are best described as freelancers, and thus of lower rung in the Somali war culture, as compared to the Shabab; the hardened religious zealots in arms, seeking to overthrow the AU backed government in Somalia.

Unlike ECOMOG, the AU has recorded abysmal failures in the affairs of the continent. It has done little for Darfur, has been ineffective on issues concerning Sudan.  And in Somalia, it is faced with the possibility of throwing in the towel.

So now, the perception of doing something in Somalia is all that matters to the AU; to maintain some motion if only to keep the mission afloat to wait for more donor support.

Enter Rawlings. And the linkage to the perception of him as a fighter, particularly in Africa (his listing by the BBC as an influential leader may also have helped), is all the AU really cares about. It cares little about the fact that Ghana at the time of Rawlings ascendancy, in its most precarious state, was nowhere near the chaos that is the present day Somalia.

However, there it is: The opportunity for Rawlings to burnish his image as an accomplished, wise and strong leader. Somalia may or may not afford him the chance.

 
E. Ablorh-Odjidja, Publisher www.ghanadot.com, Washington, DC, October 12, 2010.

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