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BURGLARY OR BANDITRY?
A Study of Super-power Perceptions of
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS – OCTOBER
1962
By E. Amatei Akuete, B. Sc. (Econ.)
Hons. (Lond.), M. A. (JHU)
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Page Five (Bibliography)
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By such display of undiplomatic
style, one wonders whether Bonsal endeared himself
to Castro and his Foreign Minister, Raul Roa, or to
the Cuban Government. The odds are that he might
have further complicated whatever outstanding issues
there were between the U.S. and Cuba. Hence, soon
after this incident, U.S. representation in Havana
experienced difficulties in their interactions with
Cuban officials and political leaders. Schlesinger
obviously laments over this turn of events when he
notes Bonsal’s trouble in getting in to see Castro,
in spite of “all his friendliness to the
revolution…” (A Thousand Days: p.221) At this point,
a careful look at some of the measures or steps
taken by the U.S. for political “damage control” is
instructive in the conduct of international affairs.
With the collapse of the hitherto
U.S.-backed Batista government, there was a strong
desire, if not a determination on the part of the
U.S. to maintain good or at best “correct” relations
with the Castro regime. Schlesinger notes that in
the efforts to mend fences with the regime, new
attempts were made by the U.S. Government in January
1960 to reach an understanding with Castro through
the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba, Dr. Julio A.
Amoedo. Unfortunately, those efforts did not succeed
but he provides no explanation for that failure. The
use of Amoedo might not have been directly related
to Bonsal’s “faux pas”. But recourse to third
parties always comes in handy in trying to resolve
difficult diplomatic issues. America’s approach was
therefore correct and acceptable.
Schlesinger also submits that in
March 1960, the U.S. again tried to resolve its
dispute with the Cuban government through the
intermediary of the Cuban Finance Minister, Rufo
Lopez Fresquet. Unlike the previous measure, this
approach was, and is most unusual. In this
instance, the U.S. did not seek the help of a
“neutral” third party but rather a key member of
Castro’s government. That approach obviously meant,
and should have indicated to all that Ambassador
Bonsal had exhausted his goodwill with his host
government, notwithstanding his friendliness and
skill. It also indicated that the U.S. Government
has run out of viable and more acceptable options.
Under those circumstances, the most appropriate
action would have been Bonsal’s recall to base to
prevent further diplomatic hemorrhage.
However, the most
significant point to note is that the choice of
Senor Fresquet as a “broker” might have given the
impression that he was an agent of the U.S.
Government. That perception must have definitely
compromised the Minister’s position in his own
government. Consequently, it was not surprising that
on March 17, 1960, Lopez Fresquet resigned from the
Cuban government; most likely, not on his own
volition but due to pressure from Castro as an
alternative to outright and embarrassing dismissal.
What was more astonishing was the fact that “on that
same day (that Fresquet resigned) in Washington,
President Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from
the CIA to train a force of Cuban exiles for
possible use against Castro.”
By this time, it had
already become common knowledge that Cuban exiles
were organizing and carrying out commando raids on
Cuban industrial installations and centres with
disastrous effects on both life and property, on the
economy as a whole, and on the morale of the Cuban
population. It should also be recalled that in
January 1960, the U.S. Government had issued a
5-Point Policy Statement on Cuba which commits the
former “to prevent the use of its territory for the
preparation of illegal acts against Cuba…”
If the CIA recommendation was indeed accepted by the
Eisenhower Administration, then U.S. expressions
about its commitments in the 5-Point Policy
Statement were no more than a hoax as the following
event shows.
In July 1960, the U.S. suspended the
Cuban sugar quota that had given preferential
purchases to Cuba to the tune of $150.0 million in
1959. Castro responded by nationalizing American
sugar mills in Cuba and proceeded with the seizure
of remaining American investments on the island.
The U.S. then demanded compensation for expropriated
American businesses as condition for the
normalization of relations without any commitment on
its part to prevent commando raids from U.S.
continental soil or territory against Cuba. Cuba
rejected such a normalization proposal because it
was overwhelmingly favourable to one side, the U.S.
The over-riding objective of the
Castro regime was survival. It is therefore
reasonable to suggest that Cuba might have settled
for a normalization formula which guaranteed, or
sought to ensure effectively, the prevention of
exile commando raids against it. In addition, Cuba
might have been satisfied with a settlement formula
which did not make the payment of compensation for
expropriated U.S. businesses a condition for the
maintenance of correct relations between the two
parties. Possibly, these two suggestions might
have, at least, given both parties some room for
maneuver in the search for an acceptable solution.
Both sides obviously missed those possible
alternatives.
It was known that the Eisenhower
Administration had wanted a more aggressive policy
towards Cuba from the very beginning. It is
unfortunate, therefore, that that Administration and
most American writers of the time and since then
should blame the lack of any accommodation on the
Castro regime. There were clearly a number of
alternating “cause and effect” actions on both sides
and, unhappily, such facts appeared to have been
overlooked.
From the submissions
above, it would be quite misleading to regard any
one single event or action as being the ‘conclusion’
or the ‘cause’ of Castro’s hostility to the U.S. as
Schlesinger poses that question. It would also be
incorrect to assert that Washington broke off
diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961, only
“because of Castro’s scornful demand that the staff
of the Havana Embassy be reduced to eleven people in
forty-eight hours.”
Apparently, for some good reasons, the eminent
historian does not give his readers any idea about
the staff complement of the American Mission in
Havana at that time. The exact figure is not known
by ‘outsiders’ of the U.S. government. But the
sheer size of the U.S. Chancery in Havana would
suggest that the staff might have run into over 200
officers and supporting staff excluding those in the
Consulates across the entire country, especially in
the Oriente and Camaguey Provinces. In contrast,
Scheer and Zeitlin put the complement of the Cuban
Mission in Washington, at the time, at eleven.
The Cuban request is
not unknown in diplomatic practice and generally, it
is accepted that a host government may suggest a
ceiling with regard to the number of officers
working in any particular foreign mission if, in its
good judgment, such an action would safeguard a
particular national interest. Sometimes, this may
be on a basis on reciprocity. But, whatever the
justification or otherwise of the measure was, in
the context of U.S.-Cuban relations at that time,
that action should have proved understandable to the
American government, if not to Americans in
general. No doubt it proved unpleasant to the
Eisenhower Administration which described it as
“scornful”. Eisenhower further added that the Cuban
request was “the limit to what the United States in
self-respect can endure.”
It is admitted that Eisenhower had every right to
comment on issues and actions as he saw fit. But his
comments on this particular issue suggested a
certain presumptuous attitude towards Castro.
As previously
stated, diplomatic relations were broken in January
1961 and the stage was set for hostile and more open
actions against each other. Meanwhile, the 1960
U.S. Presidential campaign was in progress and then
candidate, Senator John Kennedy was trading charges
of inept American policies towards the Communist
State of Cuba against the Eisenhower
Administration. Almost in identical terms, the
Republican candidate, Richard Nixon pledged that
“…the free people of Cuba – the people who want to
be free – are going to be supported and they will
attain their freedom.”
His opponent, John Kennedy, criticized U.S. economic
embargo on Cuba at that time as being “too little,
too late” and further called for American support
for “the democratic anti-Castro forces in exile and
in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of
overthrowing Castro.”
Although Nixon’s formulation was
contradictory, in that he referred to the need for a
“free people” to attain their freedom”, the
intention of the two candidates was obvious; namely,
to topple the Castro government and rid the
hemisphere of “communist menace.” This was the
setting within which the Bay of Pigs Invasion of
April 1961 took place and which event, in large
measure, constituted the prelude to the Cuban
Missile Crisis.
The late President
Kennedy is reported to have said during a campaign
speech in Cincinnati in early October 1960 that:
“For the present, Cuba is gone… For the present no
magic formula will bring it back.”
Seyom Brown also records that five days before the
exile landings at the Bay of Pigs (or the Playa
Giron as the Cubans would prefer to call it),
Kennedy had stated that “the basic issue in Cuba is
not one between the United States and Cuba. It is
between the Cubans themselves.”
According to Kennedy, this was the
principle which the United States was to adhere to
and, thereby, excluded any direct deployment of
American military power from the invasion. At this
stage, one saw signs of doubt in Kennedy about the
justification for the whole venture. And this
wavering was especially significant because a short
while earlier he had called for strong measures
against Cuba.
The excerpt of
Kennedy’s speech quoted above might have seemed to
some as signalling a new trend and they might have
thought that “behold, all things have become new…for
the former things have passed away.” (Revelations
21: 4-5). Unfortunately, those were no prophetic or
divine revelations. Schlesinger notes that Kennedy
was resolved not to allow whatever setbacks the U.S.
might encounter to “affect the main business.”
Brown admirably interprets “the main business” to
be, the prevention of Communist expansion which
would significantly change the balance of power, as
well as its containment, possibly, without recourse
to war.
Consequently, those who had hoped for changes in
U.S.-Cuban relations, including Castro, were
disappointed to realize that the U.S. had no
intention to resume diplomatic relations with Cuba
“as long as the Castro government was aligned with
the Communist bloc.”
It may be recalled
that in his Inaugural Address on January 1961,
Kennedy called for a “new quest for peace” with
Cuba. Castro embraced that call by declaring that
“for our part, we are going to begin anew…We have no
resentment of the past, but we will wait for the
action of the Kennedy Administration…” Perhaps,
excited by what had appeared to be bright prospects
for peace, Castro added that the danger of U.S.
invasion seemed to have passed with the end of the
Eisenhower Administration. The new Kennedy
Administration signifies a little hope for humanity
and peace.”
Meanwhile, and
perhaps unknown to Castro, preparations for U.S.
planned invasion continued as doubts in high circles
about its justification, effectiveness - in terms of
timing and support – were expressed and considered.
Schlesinger’s account of the event indicates that he
(Schlesinger) was personally opposed to the venture
and thought the invasion was “a terrible idea.”
However, he adds that his objection to the idea was
not based on any considerations of principle. He
had never (as he says) been too enchanted with the
supposedly sacrosanct non-intervention principle in
state relations. In any case, as a learned
historian, he was quick to point out that U.S.
history was full of precedents of the kind being
contemplated; and, as it were, the plan fitted
perfectly into “a proud U.S. tradition of supporting
refugees against tyranny in their homelands.”
On the other hand,
Schlesinger, like Macbeth before assassinating King
Duncan, saw himself overwhelmed with the possible
consequences of the act. He was concerned with the
swiftness and completeness of the impending
operation. Indeed, his words that “if we could
achieve this by a swift, surgical stroke, I would be
for it…” are strangely reminiscent of Macbeth’s
fears when he said that “if it were done when ‘tis
done, then it were well it were done quickly…”
Schlesinger further clarifies the basis of his fears
as not due to the possible impact of the invasion on
Moscow nor its impact on Latin America.
Rather, it was the possible global reaction which
might be shown if the invasion should be deemed
unjustifiable on the grounds that Cuba posed no
direct and demonstrable threat to the security of
the United States.
There were serious
apprehensions about the gloomy prospects which an
American invasion might carry in its trail. Even at
that time, some Americans, including Senator
Fulbright, did not think Cuba was a threat to the
U.S. and this opinion was shared by many elsewhere,
particularly in the Third World. The question which
needs to be answered is: ‘Why was the invasion
carried out in the face of all these
apprehensions?’ The answers may be many and,
perhaps, not a single one can be altogether
satisfactory. But after the various options have
been examined, the decision to proceed was taken
with the clear understanding that there was not
going to be any participation in the invasion by the
United States Armed Forces.
Accordingly, on April 17, 1961, a
band of 1,400 Cuban exiles trained by American
officers and equipped by the U.S. made its way from
a base in Guatemala to the shores of Cuba in the Bay
of Pigs area. Their objective was to topple the
Castro regime through armed invasion and to restore
freedom to the land. As all accounts have shown,
the venture was a total disaster.
Many explanations have been given for
the failure of the invasion, but an examination of
those reasons seems out of place in this essay. What
needs be considered are the lessons from that
failure and its effects on U.S.-Cuban relations
thereafter.
It has been indicated earlier on that
from the American point of view, Castro’s drastic
social and economic reforms and his professed
adherence to Marxism were considered incompatible
with the principles and traditions of the Western
Hemisphere. Besides, his alignment with the
Communist bloc was wholly unacceptable to the United
States and to the rest of the hemispheric members.
For these reasons, Castro must be eliminated. Hence,
the invasion.
However, the futility of the invasion
showed that contrary to American expectations and
those of the exiles, Castro’s forces were well
equipped and well trained to fight in defence of
their fatherland. It seemed there was a
single-minded purpose from the top to the bottom of
the Cuban army even if that purpose was not shared
by the entire nation. Besides, while the U.S.
government had to deal with American public opinion
in the conduct of the war, the Cuban government was
virtually free from such constraints and did not
have to look over its shoulders, as it were, for
approval or disapproval. The result of the invasion
also proved that either those Cubans disenchanted
with the revolution were not as numerous as the
exiles and the CIA had claimed or that they were too
feeble to take up arms “to regain their freedom.”
It could also be that although they might welcome a
change, they were not overly committed to the idea
of another round of revolutionary process with
unpredictable results.
The invasion equally demonstrated to
the world the high degree of Cuban nationalism. One
may add that if ever the Cuban national motto
“Patria o Muerte” (Fatherland or Death) had any
meaning to Cubans, the Bay of Pigs crisis provided
such an occasion. While it served to unite the
Cubans behind the Castro regime, it also increased
worldwide sympathy for the country. Another
important outcome of the invasion was a perceptible
resurgent nationalism in Latin America during the
early sixties, especially in Brazil, Venezuela, and
the Dominican Republic and in Argentina.
Stillman and Pfaff
may question the significance of Cuba’s nationalism,
or indeed, any kind of nationalism in the Third
World because they contend, “this has no
intellectual content and is rather an emotion that
veers into hopeless excess.”
This view is open to debate. But for the moment,
it may be useful to note that most of the Third
World nationalists are no worse that the proverbial
‘middle American’ in their passions for and devotion
to their own countries. Third World nationalists
are also not much different from those Americans who
may recognize the hollowness in a particular policy
of their own government; yet, with all seriousness
continue to chant slogans like “peace not surrender”
and hold aloft the banner of their nation.
The point here is that Third World
countries may not conform to already conceived
patterns of government or behaviour of other
nations. And there is no reason why they should.
Nonetheless, in demonstrating their love for their
own countries, they may show equal zeal as any other
people elsewhere. Above all, the wave of
nationalism which the world witnessed from the
mid-fifties through the sixties should have
indicated to many that it was becoming increasingly
difficult, if not impossible, for great powers to
hold down poor but awakened and unwilling people.
By the time of the Bay of Pigs
episode, Britain had had its Suez Crisis (1956) and
France had had its Indo-China (1946-1954) and
Algerian (1954-1962) wars with bitter experiences.
One might have hoped, therefore, that the lessons
from those events were clear enough for all. The
United States then should have deemed it necessary
to re-examine some of the basic tenets of its own
conduct in Cuba. But it did not.
Stillman and Pfaff
submit that the revolutionary governments of Iraq
and Cuba at this time were “impatient, intolerant”
and perhaps “unpragmatic”. To some extent, one may
accept this judgment. However, those countries may,
in certain respects, share these distinctions with
the United States; especially, in the apparent
contempt of experience and the extraordinary zeal
with which the U.S. sometimes seeks to remake
society “by sheer assault”
possibly in its own image. Review of America’s
relations with a number of countries in Latin
America, Asia and Africa over the past five decades
attests to the validity of this assertion.
From the foregoing, it is submitted
that the Cuban victory at Playa Girón and the
cohesion that became manifest in Cuban society -
both during the period of the invasion and after it
- can be attributed to Cuba’s desire and
determination for survival. Therefore, it appears
perfectly logical that the Castro regime should seek
to strengthen its defense capability after the
invasion. The underlying assumption being, with the
Bay of Pigs fiasco, any future invasion was more
likely to involve direct United States military
support. That possibility would clearly have meant
the end of the revolution, with a high probability
of the end of Castro’s own existence on earth.
These ominous fears were seriously –
and justifiably – entertained by the Cuban
Government. But there is always the problem which a
small and poor country might face in finding the
means for its development; let alone, the
over-burdensome expense involved in procuring the
instruments of military power for its defense. Cuba
needed not only modern weapons for its own security,
but in quantities large enough to ensure reasonably
effective defense.
But the question may well be asked
whether Cuba can realistically secure itself against
the preponderant power of the United States! If the
answer to this question is a definite “No”, then one
would further ask whether the Castro regime can
successfully ward off a combined Latin American
attack which is partly supported by the United
States. Either of these alternatives might have
offered no solace to the Castro regime because in
each case, it was bound to reckon with a formidable
force.
The basic quest for security and the
difficulties Castro faced in ensuring the regime’s
survival should constitute the framework within
which the problem of the Missile Crisis might be
viewed and examined. Admittedly, the whole episode
presents many difficulties about the big powers’
perception of their respective national interests as
well as those of their opponents. But the web of
conflicting interests and interpretations thereof
can only be disentangled if fundamental causes for
the action were clearly understood.
No one can
definitely say when the decision for the missile
installation in Cuba was taken. It is however
reasonable to guess that that decision might have
been reached sometime between May 1961 (or after the
failed Bay of Pigs invasion) and July 1962 when Raul
Castro visited the Soviet Union. The first U.S.
intelligence discovery of the missile construction
sites was made on August 29, 1962, much to the
surprise of the United States. But the evidence
gathered by subsequent U-2 reconnaissance planes
during September and in early October 1962 was not
conclusive as to provoke any drastic action by the
United States. The Kennedy Administration only
complained to the Soviet Union about what it called
the build-up of “significant offensive capability…in
Cuba” from which “the gravest issues would arise.”
Moscow replied that the armaments in Cuba were only
for defensive purposes and “there is no need for the
Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion
of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other
country, for instance Cuba…”
On October 14, 1962, another U-2
flight submitted what appeared to be unquestionable
evidence about the construction of missile launching
pads and other nuclear installations – surface to
air missiles (SAM) and intermediate range ballistic
missiles (IRBM) sites in Cuba. Based on that
intelligence report, Kennedy formed a 19-member
group of eminent advisors – later called the
Executive Committee of the National Security Council
(EX-COMM) - on October 16, 1962 to develop a policy
and propose possible actions to have the missiles
withdrawn from Cuba. This group comprised the
President, Vice President Johnson, Attorney-General
Robert Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara, Chairman JCS,
General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy, Special
Assistant to the President on National Security
Affairs and Ted Sorenson, Special Counsel, among
others.
The description of
the missile installation in Cuba as a “crisis” has
been questioned by many who thought at the time that
it was nothing more than a “drama” which was played
up for its maximum effect “on a democratic political
situation.”
It may be recalled that the crisis occurred during
the U.S. Congressional elections campaign period and
Republican members had already started charging the
Kennedy Administration of being ‘soft’ on
communism. However, in the sense that missiles were
to be deployed in an area of traditional U.S. sphere
of influence, the event indeed marked a turning
point in the relations of the super-powers. In that
respect, it can be called a ‘crisis’. The event
also posed many difficult problems about the
probable outcome of an impending confrontation. The
prospects as seen by many were repelling and anxiety
about the future was great. On these two additional
counts, it was appropriate to refer to the placement
of the missiles in Cuba as a “crisis”. If indeed it
constituted a crisis, then the next question to be
considered is the reason behind the move by the
Soviet Union to install missile launch pads in Cuba.
Schlesinger attempts
to find out reasons for the installation of the
weapons from what he calls Castro’s “confusion of
explanations.”
In that attempt, he recalls one of Castro’s public
speeches of January 1963, in which he (Castro)
explains the deal as a “Soviet idea”. But in his
interview with Herbert Matthews of the New York
Times in October 1963, Castro terms the deal a
“Cuban idea.” Meanwhile, in May 1963, Castro had
described the same operation to the late Lisa Howard
of the American Broadcasting Company as a
“simultaneous action on the part of both
governments.”
Castro’s description
to Lisa Howard seems more likely to be the truth
because, in any event, the party which suggested the
idea needed the concurrence of its ally to bring it
to fruition. That being the case, the question as
to who fathered the idea for the placement of the
missiles does not seem particularly relevant to the
issue. It is equally futile to seek reasons for
that event simply on the grounds that the Soviet
Union “had never before placed nuclear missiles in
any other country – neither in the communist nations
of Eastern Europe, nor, even in the season of their
friendship, in Red China…”
Any explanation in such terms appears to ignore the
fact that there are great differences between the
political conditions of the Eastern European nations
and Cuba, as well as differences in the relations
between those countries and the United States, and
those between Cuba and the latter.
The essential thing to mark is that
both the Soviet Union and Cuba were bent upon
mounting the type of defense arrangement which was
to be formidable enough to act as an effective
deterrent against any future invasion. Therefore,
the idea was not to ensure maximum security for the
island against the United States. It seemed this
was the crux of the matter where the Cubans and the
Russians were concerned and the different hypotheses
so far advanced may thus be examined in this light.
The fundamental assumption underlying
United States conduct towards the Soviet Union from
the end of World War II through 1989 was that Soviet
policy was expansionist in nature with world
domination as its objective. Consequently, that
unalterable drive for world conquest always impelled
the Soviets towards ultimate conflict with the West;
more especially, with the United States. Upon this
assumption, the Soviet action in Cuba attracted
interpretations which fitted perfectly into the
traditional U.S. view of its chief adversary.
Another very
interesting explanation for the missile installation
is given by Schlesinger as an act representing “the
supreme Soviet probe of American intentions” to
prove alleged charges of a so- called ‘total
victory’ faction in Moscow that “Americans were too
rich or soft or liberal to fight.” Russia could
therefore “use the utmost nuclear pressure against
the United States.”
Schlesinger does not elaborate on
this ‘total victory’ faction in terms of who they
are and their political weight in the Politburo or
in the Soviet army. He also does not show what might
be the targets of Russia’s ‘utmost nuclear
pressure.’ These unsubstantiated accounts therefore
make a weak case of the ‘Soviet probe of American
intentions’ theory.
Again, Schlesinger
asserts that Khrushchev’s explanation to the Supreme
Soviet in December 1962, that the Soviet “aim was
only to defend Cuba” was false because the defence
of Cuba did not really require long range missiles.
In truth, nothing can really provide impregnable
defence for Cuba against the United States. He
further argues that, even a successful
nuclearization of Cuba with twenty-four reusable
pads for medium-range missiles and sixteen pads for
IRBMs could only “come near to doubling Soviet
striking capacity against American targets. Since
this would still leave the United States with at
least a 2 to 1 superiority in nuclear power targeted
against the Soviet Union, the shift in the military
balance of power would be less crucial than that in
the political balance…”
Schlesinger’s
summation is plausible; but that only strengthens
the “deterrence” theory as a valid argument.
Kennedy’s description of the missile emplacement as
“an effort…which would have politically changed the
balance of power…”
lends additional weight to the argument that the
Soviets and the Cubans intended using those weapons
more for bargaining than for war. Seyom Brown
expresses the same view when he speaks of
Khrushchev’s intrusion into “our sphere of
control…in a manner that, if allowed to stand as a
‘fait accompli’ would tip the balance of power
against us.”
These statements suggest that the
United States’ reading of Soviet intentions for the
placement of the missiles was, primarily, in
geopolitical terms based on the ‘sphere of
influence’ theory which had come to be accepted as
part of the unspecified ground rules of political
conduct among the super-powers. The validity of the
‘sphere of influence’ theory which, in essence,
confers on the super-powers some tacit right of
condominium over some areas of the world is
questionable. And one would argue that such tacit
division of the world among the super-powers
invariably causes more instability through
confrontations than prevents the upheavals which we
dread.
In searching for explanations
regarding the missiles, others have argued that it
was a tactical measure by the Soviet Union to reopen
the Berlin question at the time. In other words, it
was meant to be a political decoy with designs on
Berlin. That possibility was indeed feared by the
United States because Berlin appeared to be more
central in its defence calculations where Europe
and, therefore, the West were concerned. As events
turned out, Khrushchev did not move against Berlin
in keeping with his earlier intimation to that
effect.
---------------------------------
18. Schlesinger Jr.,
Arthur M., op. cit.,p.222
19. Bonsal, Philip W., op cit., p.271
20. Schlesinger, Jr.
Arthur M., op.cit., p.222
21. Scheer, Robert & Zeitlin, Maurice, op. cit.,
p.206
22. Scheer, Robert & Zeitlin, Maurice, op. cit.,
p.207
23. The New York Times: 7 October, 1970: Reproduced
by Scheer & Zeitlin, op. cit., p.199
24. The New York
Times: 21 October, 1970: Reproduced by Scheer &
Zeitlin, op. cit., p.202
25. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op. cit., p.225
26. Brown, Seyom, The Faces of Power: Constancy and
Change in U.S. Foreign Policy from Truman to
Johnson, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1968,
p.223)
27. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op. cit., p.276
28. Brown, Seyom, op. cit., p.224
29. The New York Times: 26 January, 1961: On
Kennedy’s Press Conference of January 25, 1961)
30. Ibid: 22
January, 1961: Reproduced by Scheer & Zeitlin “Cuba:
An American Tragedy” (Penguin Books, 1964, p.208)
31. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op. cit., p.252
32. Ibid
33. Shakespeare, William. Macbeth: Act I, Scene 7.
34. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op. cit., p.253
35. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op cit., p.262
36. Stillman, Edmund
& Pfaff, William, The New Politics: America & The
End of the Postwar World (Harper Colophon, New York,
1961, p.128)
37. Stillman, Edmund
& Pfaff, William, op. cit, p.128
38. Schlesinger, Jr.,
Arthur M., op cit., p.799
39. The Economist
(London): 27 October 1962
40. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op cit., p.795
41. Ibid
42. Schlesinger, Jr.,
Arthur M., op. cit. p.796
43. Ibid
44. President Kennedy’s Television Interview: 17
December, 1962: Reproduced by Brown, Seyom, op.
cit., p.259
45. Brown, Seyom, op. cit., p.259
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