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Continued from page three
BURGLARY OR BANDITRY?
A Study of Super-power Perceptions of
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS – OCTOBER
1962
By E. Amatei Akuete, B. Sc. (Econ.)
Hons. (Lond.), M. A. (JHU)
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Page Five (Bibliography)
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Brown (p.260)
attributes Khrushchev’s ‘inaction’ not to any desire
to keep his word, but rather because his missiles in
Cuba were not yet operational.
Brown’s view is shared by many American writers.
Harold Hinton, for instance, suggests that “Soviet
missiles were sent to Cuba in all probability in
order to coerce the United States, after the
Congressional elections, in agreeing to a German
settlement on Khrushchev’s terms…”
The linkage of Berlin with Cuba by
these writers is an assumption of high probability.
However, why the Soviets should be presumed to use
Cuba as bait and only “after the Congressional
elections” has not been satisfactorily demonstrated
by these writers. At best, then, this hypothesis of
a “diversionary move” can be regarded as only
plausible for it raises several questions about
Soviet behavior which cannot be answered unless, of
course, one wants to be dogmatic.
In addition to this
were the “soft-spot probing” and “testing”
interpretations
which suggest that the Soviets have some compulsion
to fill power vacuums wherever they may be found.
If such ventures become successful, then they might
be encouraged to attempt aggression elsewhere.
These theories came into prominence during the
Truman Administration with the Korean War. And,
without much examination of their usefulness, it
seems the Missile Crisis was seen in that light and
this accounted for the call for “tough action”
against Cuba.
Assuming that the Russians have that
proclivity to foment worldwide disorder whenever
circumstances permit, one may doubt whether they
would always be deterred by “tough action” from
their opponent. It does not seem likely that a
great nation would indefinitely recoil in a series
of encounters. Apart from that, it appears that the
criers of doom never considered the effects which
their own utterances might have on the actions of
the Soviets. For, it is a fact that each side’s
conduct in a given situation and its perception of
the other’s intentions do affect decisions on both
sides.
It was obvious during this period
that Americans felt threatened by the presence of
missiles 90 miles off their shores and they were
indignant about what the Kennedy called a Soviet
deception. The basis of this charge, as Kennedy
pointed out, was the Soviet government’s statement
of September 11, 1962 which, in part, referred to
the armaments and military equipment in Cuba as
being “exclusively for defensive purposes.” In that
statement, the Soviets further denied the necessity
for a weapons shift “for a retaliatory blow to any
other country, for instance Cuba…”
In his attempt to
hold up American ‘good conduct’, Kennedy charged by
inference that Soviet missiles were transferred to
Cuba “under cloak of secrecy.”
By implication, the United States had never done
such a clandestine act. Kennedy’s statement stands
as a classic example of political double-talk. He,
for instance, spoke of the United States having “no
desire to dominate or conquer any other nation nor
impose (its) system upon (other) people.” If that
were true, then the question is: why the fuss over
Cuba?
When Kennedy spoke of Soviet
deception and charged them for acting clandestinely,
one wonders whether it were in the so-called “ground
rules” that such actions should be announced to the
world. Or, was it Kennedy’s understanding that the
Soviets were accountable to America? Certainly, he
was not the type of man to have entertained such a
fantastic notion. What point was he making then?
Again, the charge of Soviet
clandestine action cannot be supported even purely
on physical grounds. The missile sites were
originally seen by members of the EX-COMM as a
“playing field”. This means the sites were open
plane spaces and there appeared to have been no
attempt by the Soviets to camouflage these. Whether
any camouflage was possible at all is open to
question and the argument cannot be made that such a
cover might have proved difficult for U.S.
intelligence to detect.
However, the fact that Kennedy felt
cheated by Khrushchev on certain undertakings he had
made, whilst he (Kennedy) ignored or refused to
believe some other submissions in the same statement
is quite baffling. Any nation reserves the right to
decide what set of evidence to admit and what to
reject on any given issue. But when there are no
stated grounds for the inadmissibility of part of
evidence when maximum use is being made of other
related facts, then the basis for the selection
becomes highly questionable.
One also notices an
instance of fruitless semantic bouts concerning what
weapons are ‘offensive’ and which are ‘defensive’.
As someone once said, ‘this is purely a matter of
where one stood in relation to the weapon.’ Readers
may note that in 1961, the U.S. had over 100 Jupiter
missiles based in Italy and Turkey with the
capability to strike Moscow. On this issue,
Khrushchev pointedly noted that those destructive
rocket weapons in Turkey were literally at the elbow
of the Soviet Union.
Therefore, by every consideration, those missiles
constituted a threat to the Soviet Union just as the
U.S. Government thought of the missiles in Cuba.
Kennedy seemed to contend that the
Soviet Union should have respected the sphere of
influence principle and not ventured into Cuba. By
the same token, the United States should have been
conscious of the fact that the areas bordering the
Soviet Union – including Turkey – have always been,
and are of special interest to the Russians. In
consequence, the U.S. should have stayed out of
those areas. In essence, Khrushchev’s submission
can be regarded as a rejection of the so-called
ground rules of behavior, the observance of which
was supposed to redound to the general good.
Happily, events were not pressed too far. Both
leaders appeared to be greatly concerned about
limiting, to the minimum, the risks involved in a
head-long collision. In that respect, Kennedy’s
role cannot be underestimated and the different
policy actions considered are worth noting.
Briefly stated, the EX-COMM
considered a total of six alternative policies for
the United States. In the first place, there was
some advocacy for what became known as the “do
nothing” policy. The arguments in support of that
policy were that the vulnerability of the United
States from Soviet nuclear weapons could not be
worsened by the proximity of those instruments
installed in Cuba. It was perfectly understood that
while their presence in Cuba enhanced Soviet
strategic reach, the value of such an ‘advantage’
was thought to be of little or no importance. Some
counter arguments were expressed in terms of savings
to the Soviet Union in the overall expenditure on
nuclear weapons production, particularly, with
regard to long-range missiles.
Other arguments were
settled on questions about credibility, not so much
in terms of United States commitments around the
globe, but more in geopolitical terms with regard to
the Western hemisphere. Another suggestion centered
around possible diplomatic approaches to Khrushchev
for removal of the missiles from Cuba with a
possible trade-off by the U. S. to remove the
Jupiter missiles from Turkey and Italy. The
proposed “quid pro quo” policy proved unacceptable
to the EX-COMM on the grounds that the Soviets might
be tempted to make demands elsewhere and, thereby,
produce a sort of snowball effect. This explanation
seems as unsatisfactory as the notion that the
Soviets would always back down only when confronted
with the use of force or threat thereof. While
there may be some truth in Dean Acheson’s policy of
“negotiation from strength”,
the indiscriminate application of that idea at all
times may not always be profitable.
There were other aspects of the
‘diplomatic approach’ policy that must be noted;
namely, reference to the U.N. Security Council for
consideration of the matter or secret diplomatic
approach to Castro. The suggestion to refer the
matter to the Security Council was eventually ruled
out because it was feared that the Soviets might use
the veto where the Council’s decision favoured the
United States. It was also thought that debate in
the Council would be time-consuming and the Soviets
might thus be able to complete the missile
installation.
The idea of a secret approach to
Castro was thought to hold no prospects under the
assumption (later proved right) that control action
over the missile emplacement rested with the Soviets
and not with the Cuban government. It is also
conceivable that judging the emotionally charged
atmosphere in the U.S., members of EX-COMM might
have considered it ‘infra dig’ for the United States
to approach Castro secretly to resolve this
important issue.
Next was a proposal
for an invasion that was ruled out without much
difficulty because it seemed to most people that
such a move was to court a nuclear disaster. Another
option considered was a surprise, surgical air
strike. Many members of EX-COMM, especially Robert
Kennedy and Robert McNamara felt that such a move
would be out of tune with American traditions and
there was no guarantee that the operation would be
neat and final. Here, the doubts centered around
the possibility of a response from Cuba with
undestroyed missiles. The only safeguard against
such retaliation was seen to be a massive attack by
the United States. Recourse to that action was also
rejected because of the large number of innocent
Cubans that would be killed and the possible damage
to the United States’ image in the hemisphere.
Members of EX-COMM were equally
apprehensive about Soviet reaction elsewhere,
notably in Turkey, Italy or Berlin. If the Soviets
were to move on any of these places and hold it as
‘hostage’ against Cuba, the questions would then be:
What next? Would the United States release its hold
on Cuba and concentrate its efforts on Europe and,
thereby, risk a general war with Russia? Or
alternatively, would the Soviets consider Cuba that
important to warrant a world war? Answers to these
questions can only be speculative since the danger
at the time lay in a hypothetical future.
The policy alternative which proved
generally acceptable was that of a naval quarantine
or blockade. The pros and cons of the underlying
reasons have been fully stated in several places and
need not be repeated. But perhaps one may recall
the salient points in that decision for a reasonable
evaluation of the whole event.
In the first instance, the blockade
offered much scope for ‘graduated response’ if ever
such a need arose. It was considered to be a firm
demonstration of U.S. intentions but not as
precipitous as an air strike. Furthermore, it
offered the Soviet Union the opportunity for a
reconsideration of their own actions to scale down
the tension which was then building up.
No one can say what might have
happened in the event of a showdown. However, to
the relief of the entire world, there was no dead
end in the whole episode. The Soviet Union
sidetracked its ships then on their way to Cuba and
on October 26, submitted the Lebanese freighter
‘Marucla’ under Soviet charter to U.S. inspection in
conformity with the Kennedy quarantine proclamation.
Eventually, the Soviets dismantled and withdrew the
missiles from Cuba. The latter two actions were
undertaken with the understanding that the U.S. was
not to invade Cuba and that the blockade was to be
lifted.
What lessons can be drawn from this
historical event? In the preceding paragraphs it
has been shown that there were discrepancies in the
interpretations of words and phrases by the
super-powers which made understanding of certain
issues much more involved than they should be if the
connotations had been the same. But this difficulty
cannot be attributed to any willful action on the
part of the Soviets or the Americans. The most
probable cause for such misunderstandings seems to
lie in a mutual desire by the contending parties to
present their respective actions as being ‘just’. In
addition, it has been pointed out that arguments
about the meaning of such words are fruitless
exercises.
The late Adlai
Stevenson understood the futility of that exercise
when he said that “words can be stretched only so
far without losing their meaning altogether. But
semantic disputes are fruitless…”
Yet, strangely enough, the same gentleman questioned
the Soviet description of arms in Cuba as of a
“defensive character” and demanded to know what the
Soviets would consider as “offensive” weapons. So
far as the late gentleman was concerned - and the
same is true of many Americans - the meaning of a
word could only be right if it conformed to American
usage. Both Kennedy and Stevenson themselves did
not define the words “offensive” and “defensive.”
Could it be that they wanted to conceal their real
intentions and thereby make a villain out of
America’s adversary? What would Stevenson have
considered as “defensive” weapons?
Other difficulties
in perception relate to questions about the reasons
for the missile emplacement. The case has been made
quite clearly that both the Soviet Union and Cuba
were primarily concerned with the security of Cuba.
This view is passionately rejected by the United
States; or at least, it was so rejected by the
Kennedy Administration. At first, it was a question
about Soviet desire to change the ‘status quo’ in
the balance of power. When it was proved that the
Soviet missiles in Cuba had no strategic value, the
‘plea’ was changed to a ‘sphere of influence’
consideration which the Soviets had violated. It
was also stated that the United States’ objection to
Castro’s Cuba was non-ideological and that the
United States was prepared to live with Cuba (as it
was) if it had not “invited an extra-continental,
anti-democratic and expansionist power into the
bosom of the American family…”
Adlai Stevenson’s
words were clearly contradictory. If American
objections to Castro’s Cuba were indeed
non-ideological, then there should be no reason why
Cuba’s relations with the Soviet Union should prove
detestable. It is also difficult to reconcile
Stevenson’s view with that of Kennedy when the
latter stated that “the Cuban question must be
considered as a part of the worldwide challenge
posed by communist threats to the peace…”
These examples of contradictions in or
misrepresentation of stated views can be multiplied
several times over.
In his address of
October 22, 1962, on the crisis, Kennedy invoked
God’s blessings on America’s goal which he stated as
not being “the victory of might but the vindication
of right – not peace at the expense of freedom, but
both peace and freedom, here…and around the world…”
With those words of the President, one could not
help agreeing with Morgenthau’s summation that
“invocation of moral principles for the support of
national policies is always, and of necessity a
pretence”
perhaps for something less glorious.
When the crisis was over, there was
general agreement that the two leaders, Kennedy and
Khrushchev, had both displayed a high sense of
responsibility towards mankind. The greater credit
was given to Kennedy who appeared to have handled
the problem with great skill and deliberation. The
fact that the Soviets retreated was widely
interpreted to mean defeat and humiliation to
Khrushchev and to the Soviet Union.
Others (especially
in the Soviet-bloc and the Non-aligned Nations)
would contend that the event was a victory for
Khrushchev. But, was there a victor or a
vanquished? And who was what? In the words of both
Kennedy and Khrushchev, respectively, who was the
“burglar” and who was the “bandit”?
These questions again evolve around the problem of
perceptions of the various interests pursued.
Where the United States was
concerned, few would doubt that Kennedy’s actions
saved the day. He proved firm and resolute in his
demands to Khrushchev and yet was cautious enough
not to overstretch himself to court disaster. By
deciding on the policy of a blockade but without
neglecting other preparations for contingencies,
Kennedy was able to apply enough pressure on the
Soviets without making himself obnoxious. Some
would also claim that he bolstered up the morale of
his nation which, at that time, was low following
the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion.
With regard to
Khrushchev, one would argue that in view of the
finite nature of his objectives (as demonstrated
above), his retreat cannot be regarded as a tragic
setback to any imagined Soviet designs. May be it
was simply prudent considering the posture of the
United States. On the other hand, Kennedy’s pledge
not to invade Cuba and his expression of confidence
“that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would
be prepared to do likewise”
constituted significant achievement by Khrushchev
and not, as some would argue, “a residuary
achievement of the Soviet adventure.”
Through the installation of the
missiles in Cuba, today (fifty-three years after the
event) the Castro regime continues to exercise
control on the island. One may not be enchanted
with conditions in Cuba or what it professes to do
outside the island. However, it would be the
responsibility of Cubans to effect any changes they
may need.
In the cubic political equation on
the Missile Crisis, Castro’s value is generally
regarded as minimal. Naturally, he was disappointed
at the way the super-powers handled the issue and he
was known to have expressed his displeasure to the
Soviets in no mistaken terms. He also came to
realize how misguided it might be to rely on the
promises of big powers for protection. However, by
his refusal to allow proposed site inspection, in
spite of the intercession by U Thant (who was the
United Nations Secretary-General at the time),
Castro proved that he was still the master of his
domain.
Above all, the missile crisis showed
the definite limits within which the super-powers
may engage in skirmishes. The small nations might
have also learnt that they stood to lose if they got
too involved in such delicate situations. While
they (i.e. the small nations) may attain their
particular objectives sometimes, they also run the
risk of becoming military and political dartboards
for the super-powers once the latter decide to
pursue their own vital interests. Under such
conditions, the small nation’s quest for
self-assertion, and the exercise of its freedom both
become seriously compromised through its own poor
judgment.
There is no doubt that a nation would
not forge a particular course of action which it
conceives not to be in its best interests at any
given moment. That being the case, it is not only
logical but absolutely important that the question
as to whose good any specific measure is, should be
fully and exclusively determined by the subject of
that particular act.
Both Kennedy and
Johnson declared that it was the right of the Cubans
to fashion whatever government they desired. At
Punta del Este, Dean Rusk also said that “our
hemisphere has room for a great number of economic
systems.”
At about the same time, Adlai Stevenson rejected
Castro’s overtures for improved relations as a
desire (on Castro’s part) “to place the seal of
approval on the existence of a Communist regime in
the Western hemisphere.” As he asserted, “the
maintenance of Communism in the Americas is not
negotiable.”
These statements once again show a certain amount of
confusion in U.S. foreign policy formulation,
understanding or implementation, if not duplicity.
The Western hemisphere is declared to
have room to accommodate several economic systems.
Yet, as if to reaffirm U.S. resolve to keep the
hemisphere in its own image, the U.S. military in
“Operation Power Pack” intervened in the Dominican
Republic in April 1965 to conduct “combat and
stability operations” in order to prevent the spread
of communist influence (in Latin America) and the
establishment of another Cuba. This was less than
three years after the missile crisis.
Dean Wilcox once
said that the United States “identifies the
well-being of the world community, under freedom
with the security and welfare of the American
people…In essence, it seeks for the other peoples
the blessings we enjoy at home.”
It is no
exaggeration to say that this is an example of “the
dogma of the immaculate conception of American
Foreign Policy.”
In that connection, one may note that there has been
a strong American desire since the end of World War
II to “shape the course of history” with a
missionary zeal and that desire seems to lie at the
root of U.S. policy towards many areas of the world,
especially, Latin America. Paradoxically, one often
reads that the American “objective is neither
conquest nor territorial aggrandizement.” That may
well be. However, it is submitted that the impact
of a successful world-wide U.S. crusade calculated
to preserve American security in the terms just
mentioned above, would not be very dissimilar to the
effect of a conquest or territorial aggrandizement.
This submission is not to suggest
that the Russian view of the world and Soviet
conception of its own place in it during the Cold
War era was, or should have been any more attractive
to all others. The point here is that the
super-powers have been, and are all engaged in a
world-wide competition for political, military, and
economic supremacy and that their respective images
of the world are not fundamentally different from
one another. The variable factors may be timing and
tactics, and the areas of operation may continue to
shift. But in a large measure, their purposes are
identical. What ought to be noted is that the
‘raison d’être’ for forming any political or
military alliances has never been altruism.
Furthermore, the quest for leadership
in international politics and the attempts by
nations to wield influence globally or in certain
regions cannot and should not be regarded as a “good
Samaritan” exercise. If this submission is tenable,
then the critics of United States’ policy towards
Cuba at the height of the Cold War or even now may
wish to re-examine their position. Can one
therefore speak of the “burglar” or the “bandit” in
the case of the missile crisis?
The analysis so far suggests that it
would be quite misleading to make such a
distinction. It is generally conceded that
Khrushchev’s withdrawal of the missiles was a
victory for Kennedy and the United States. As the
argument goes, it was impossible for the United
States to tolerate a hostile neighbor separated by
no more than 90 miles of water from its shores.
But the reverse equally holds good
for Cuba and there is no doubt that its position is
even more dangerous because of the great disparity
in their (U.S. & Cuba) respective powers. It is
probably true that the presence of Soviet missiles
in Cuba posed some threat, however insignificant, to
the security of the United States.
No doubt, the United States was able
to force the withdrawal of missiles from Cuba. But
few appear to remember that this was achieved by
U.S. unqualified guarantee to co-exist with Cuba and
leave the island “unmolested”. This seems the most
probable explanation for the emplacement of the
missiles in the first place as clearly illustrated
above. Thus, by backing down, Khrushchev gained the
necessary assurances for Cuba’s security – a
commitment which the U.S. was most unprepared to
accept a short while earlier – and left Soviet
influence on the island in no worse condition than
it had been before the crisis.
Obviously, Castro was displeased with
the Russians in the immediate months after the
removal of the missiles. However, today it is most
likely he would be appreciative of Khrushchev’s
perilous gamble which has enabled him to consolidate
his revolution since 1962.
In summary, one would argue that any
consideration of the outcome of the missile crisis
as total victory or total defeat for either side
would be most misleading. Neither is it helpful to
conceive of the event as an act of “burglary” or
“banditry” in the manner both Kennedy and Khrushchev
seemed to suggest. The confusion appears to have
arisen because of scant analysis of the perceptions
of the super-powers with regard to their interests,
policies, actions and the effect of these on each
other’s subsequent actions and moves. Clearly, no
one can claim to have all the facts; not even
Kennedy, Khrushchev or Fidel Castro. But masking
whatever realities there are by several kinds of
disguises by way of unsubstantiated explanations –
as most writers on either side of the line have done
– is to detract from the event some valuable
political lessons.
---------------------------------
46. Spanier, John, American Foreign Policy Since
World War II (Praeger, New York, 1968, p.177)
47. Wolfers, Arnold (ed.) Changing East-West
Relations and the Unity of the West (Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, 1964, p.78)
48. Halperin, Morton H., Limited War in the Nuclear
Age (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1968, p.45)
49.
Pachter, Henry M., Collision Course (Praeger, New
York, 1963, p.194)
50.
Excerpt from Khrushchev’s letter to Kennedy on 27
October, 1962. Reproduced by Pachter, Henry M., op.
cit., p.218
51. Acheson, Dean, State Department Bulletin, 20
February, 1950.
52. Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur M., op . cit., p.804
53. Stevenson, Adlai, Excerpt from speech in the
U.N. Security Council, 23 October, 1962: Reproduced
by Pachter, Henry M., op. cit., p.206
54. Ibid
55. President Kennedy: Address from the White House,
22 October, 1962, Reproduced by Pachter, Henry M.,
op. cit., p.197
56. Morgenthau, Hans J., National Interest and Moral
Principles in Foreign Policy: The Primacy of the
National Interest (American Scholar XVIII, Spring
1949, p.207)
57. Kennedy, Robert F., Thirteen Days: A Memoir of
the Cuban Missiles Crisis (Signet Books: New
American Library, New York, pp.74, 80)
58. Kennedy, Robert F., op. cit., p.103
59. The Economist (London): 3 November, 1962, p433
60. Pachter, Henry M., op. cit., p.81
61. Excerpt from Adlai Stevenson’s Speech at the
United Nations: Reproduced in the New York Times, 9
October, 1962.
62. Dean Wilcox, “The Role of the United States in
World Affairs: Concept of Leadership”. Department of
State Background Paper; General Foreign Policy
Series No. 128, August 1958.
63. de Madariaga, Salvador, Latin America Between
the Eagle and the Bear, (New York, Praeger, 1962)
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